

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



You're broken every agreement you made at Tehran Yalta and Potsdam. You have no morals no honor. Your whole program at this conference has been based on lies and propaganda.

Now do you want an end to hostilities in Korea or do you want China and and Siberia destroyed? You may have one or the other which ever you want. These



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



lies ~~and~~ of yours at this  
conference have gone far e-  
nough. You either accept our  
fair and just proposal or you  
will be completely destroyed.

Read Confucius on morals to  
them. Read Buddha's code to them  
Read the Declaration of Indepen-  
dence to them. Read the French  
declaration Liberty & Fraternity.  
Read the Bill of Rights to them.  
Read the 5, 6 & 7<sup>th</sup> Chapters of St  
Matthew to them. Read St. John's  
prophecy on Ant. Christ and here



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

your own interpreter do it.  
You're enough real truth  
here to last you a month.  
Be sure the world press is  
briefed on every meeting  
where you follow these  
instructions.

The C. in C.







July 1954

## Public Service

Most men when they reach the age to begin to think, that is from 17 to 24, want to come to an immediate conclusion as to their future place in the world. Some have been good students of history and biography — most have not. Some accept the "get by" theory, a great many honestly want to make good on merit and ability. Some become great financiers and big business men by sharp practice, some work through the great professions, medicine and law by the same methods.



But there are honorable men in all walks of life; in fact honest men far outnumber the men of sharp practice. Honest men in the legal and medical professions have arranged a code of ethics which, if followed there would be no sharp practice in either of those professions.

In politics which is the science of government men have been discussing right and wrong and the rights of the individual since the time of the great Babylonian law giver Hammurabi; Moses the great law giver of the Hebrews Aristotle whose essay on politics



has scarcely been equaled,  
St. Paul and the Gospels,  
St. Thomas <sup>Aquinas</sup> ~~Quinn~~, Marcus  
Aurelius Antoninus, Justinian,  
Machiaveli, the origins of the  
British Common Law and  
the Code Napoleon.

There has been much  
chaff and a lot of gobbledygook  
written and discussed about  
the ethics of a politician. If  
the young man chooses politics  
as a profession he'll find it  
to his advantage to study the  
lives of all the great leaders  
throughout history starting  
with Greece and the great



leaders of the city republics  
and the great leaders of the  
heyday of the Roman Republic.  
He should study carefully and  
thoroughly the rise and the  
leaders of the American Govern-  
ment from 1776 to date.

He should carefully study the  
lives of the leaders of the Continen-  
tal Congress, the Constitutional  
Convention, and he should  
know the lives and motives of  
every President of the United  
States. Congressional leaders  
in every Presidential Admin-  
istration should be carefully  
studied along with their ethics  
and their motives.



Then he should know his State History from its colonial or territorial beginnings as well as his county history. If he lives in a town or city he should know his city government and its workings just as he should know how his county government works.

It takes seven years of hard study and an equal number of practice to make a doctor. Then he must have the desire to be one. Equally as much time is required to make a good lawyer. Some doctors and a



great many lawyers never  
get out of the mediocre class.

It takes a life time of  
the hardest kind of work  
and study to become a suc-  
cessful politician. A great doc-  
tor is known by the size of his  
practice and his ability as a  
diagnostician. A great lawyer  
is known by his knowledge of  
the law and his ability to  
win cases and properly ad-  
vise his clients. A great financier  
is known by the money he controls.

A great politician is known  
for the service he renders.  
He doesn't have to become  
President or Governor or the  
head of his city or county to



to be a great politician.  
There are mayors of villages,  
county attorneys, county com-  
missioners or supervisors who  
render just as great service  
locally as do the heads of the  
government.

No young man should  
go into politics if he wants  
to get rich or if he expects  
an adequate reward for  
his services. An honest public  
servant can't become rich  
in politics. He can only at-  
tain greatness and satis-  
faction by service.

My political career.

I had studied history, read  
everything I could get my



hands on including some of the encyclopedias in the Independence Library. I was particularly interested in the individuals who had made the history that the professional historians wrote and distorted to suit their own views.

I fall the historians of the past wrote as Henry Adams and old man Beard and his wife did in modern times, there is very little of past history to be believed from Thucydides, Herodotus, Tacitus to Greene and Gage. But when the lives of great men are studied from the records they leave some real idea of what



happened. ~~may be gained.~~

My mother bought a four volume set when I was about ten years old called Great Men and Famous Women. That book with Abbott's Lives of Great Men and the Encyclopedia gave me some idea of how men attained places in history.

In reading the lives of American Presidents, Generals and Legislators, I attained a knowledge of how they rose to the top. It seemed to me that princes, military men, financiers, lawyers and school



teachers usually began at the bottom did good jobs in whatever they undertook and finally reached the top.

As soon as I was twenty one I joined the militia. I was working in a bank, studying finance at the time I became a member of Battery B of the Missouri National Guard.

After three years in the bank at the bottom of the ladder the family moved back to the 600 acre farm which belonged to my grandmother on my mother's side. I joined the family on the farm in 1906 and with my father and brother helped to



run the farm. My father  
was always interested <sup>in</sup> local  
politics wherever he happened to be.

He was appointed roadover-  
seer in a large district which  
included the small village of  
Grandview. In helping him on  
the road between farm work  
I became acquainted with every-  
one in the Township. In 1908  
my father was reappointed a  
Judge of Election in Grandview  
Precinct and I became the  
Democratic Clerk. There were  
about 150 to 200 voters in the  
precinct at that time and  
all the judges and the two  
clerks knew every one of the



voters. I served as clerk and my father as judge of election until his death in 1915. Then I succeeded him as road overseer. I became interested in a mining deal along with a neighbor and a promoter from Harrisonville. I learned a lot about hard rock mining and recieved a lot experience but made no money.

In the meantime my brother had married and moved another farm and I continued to run the home farm by hiring a couple of men.

In 1917 President Wilson was



forced into the war by the German submarine policy. I had been very much interested in his nomination in 1912 and became one of his great admirers. All of us in the Democratic line up were very highly pleased with his re-election in 1916.

When the war came due to my 17 years experience in Battery B I pitched in and helped to expand Batteries B and C into a regiment. I had hoped to become a sergeant in one of the new batteries but became a 1<sup>st</sup>



Lieutenant in Battery F,  
went through strenuous  
training period at Ft. Sill  
School of Fire and Battery  
Administration at Camp  
Doniphan at the same time.  
Was examined for promotion  
in March and sent overseas  
on March 30<sup>th</sup> 1917 to another  
School of Fire. When that  
was finished I became a  
Captain and Bn. Adjutant  
and then Bty Commander  
and Bn. instructor in firing.

After some three months  
on the front the Armistice came  
and in February <sup>we</sup> were moved



to Beest as a Port of Embarca-  
tion for home. Arrived at Camp  
Fineston, Kansas May 5<sup>th</sup> and was  
discharged May 6<sup>th</sup> 1919.

Returned to the farm but  
could not settle down on it.  
Opened a furnishing goods  
store in Kansas City which  
was prosperous for two years  
and failed in 1922.

That year I ran for a  
County Court place and won  
it. In a five man race  
for the nomination I out-  
campaigned the other four and  
became the Judge of the County



Court for the Eastern District of Jackson, <sup>County</sup> learned an immense amount about public administration in two years and was defeated for reelection in 1924 because of a split in the Democratic Party.

In 1926 I was elected Presiding Judge of Jackson County Court and took over the running of the administrative end of the County Government. I became thoroughly informed on every phase of County administration, suggested



reform on procedure which were not adopted, became acquainted with the Missouri Legislature and all the County Judges in the State. I caused the whole road system of the county to be rebuilt, rebuilt its public buildings and put it on a sound financial basis. I organized a regional planning system for the metropolitan area which included three counties in Kansas and three in Missouri.

In 1934 I became a candidate for the Senate. Carried



on the same kind of campaign I had for Eastern Judge and won the nomination. I knew all County Judges and County Clerks in the State, had been very active in State Legion affairs and was on my way up in the Grand Lodge A. F. & A. M. of Missouri.

Was elected in the fall of 1934 and went to Washington in December to be sworn in as the Junior U.S. Senator from Missouri.

I became a member of the Appropriations Committee



the Interstate Commerce Committee and the Public Buildings and Grounds Committee. I worked my best in all of them carrying documents and files home with me to work on.

In Appropriations, I became acquainted with every phase of the immense structure of the Federal Government. On Interstate Commerce I became familiar with every phase of transportation. On Public Buildings and Ground I learned about Government



buildings and their upkeep.

In 1940 I had the primary fight of my life against the Governor and the brother of one of my opponents in 1934.

I made a strenuous campaign and won.

In ~~1940~~ 1941 I organized an investigating committee to watch expenditure of the military after the draft act was passed. That committee made a good reputation and is credited with saving the taxpayers fifteen billion dollars.



In 1944 I was nominated  
at Chicago by the Democrats  
for Vice President. I was e-  
lected with Franklin Roosevelt  
on a platform I helped to  
write. I was sworn in  
as Vice President Jan 20, 1945,  
on the south porch of the  
White House. On April 12<sup>th</sup>  
1945 President Roosevelt died  
and I became President of  
the United States.

In all this long career  
I had certain rules which  
I followed in, loss or dear.  
I refused to <sup>le</sup>handle any



political money in any way  
whatever. I ~~kept~~ engaged in  
no private  
interests whatever that could  
be helped by local, state or  
national governments. I re-  
fused presents, hotel ac-  
commodations or trips which  
were paid for by private parties.

There were opportunities  
by the wholesale for making  
immense amounts of money  
at the county level and also  
in the Senate. I lived on the  
Salary I was legally entitled  
to and considered that I  
was employed by the taxpayers,  
and the people of my county, state



and nation.

I made no speeches for  
money or expense, while  
I was in the Senate, <sup>or</sup> as  
V.P. or as President.

I would much rather  
be an honorable public ser-  
vant and known as such  
than to be the richest man  
in the world.





February 28, 1947  
5: 45 p.m.

Loy,

If I were writing this this evening, I would change the emphasis somewhat from the general dollar problem and bring in more the necessity for bolstering up democracy throughout the world. I do not think, therefore, that you can accept any of this as a literal suggestion, but merely as a bolder and more imaginative presentation of our economic policy needs in view of today's crisis.

If Mr. Acheson wants to do anything about this, I think that the best procedure for him would be to telephone Clark Clifford and raise the question with him, and, through him, with the President, as to whether in view of the Greek crisis, he does not want the Department to recast the latter half of his Baylor address.

JMJ



~~TOP SECRET~~Sept working  
7 Feb 48

DRAFT

At the White House meeting on February 27 the British notes were presented to the Congressional Delegation and the situation explained to them.

The first question that was raised was how much was this going to amount to--what are we getting in for. Some suggested that the matter should be presented to the public as aid to the Greeks for the Greeks are popular in this country, etc. But that argument didn't get very far.

The second question raised was, does this mean pulling British chestnuts out of the fire? There was a very adverse reaction when this point was raised.

At that point the Secretary and Mr. Acheson proceeded to a very frank discussion of the whole situation in the following terms: In the last 18 months the position of the democracies throughout the world has materially deteriorated. While Secretary Byrnes and Senators Connolly and Vandenberg have been going from conference to conference trying to hold together the heart of international cooperation, the Russians have been engaged in the systematic policy of trying to encircle Germany and Turkey with Soviet dominated states.

The encirclement of Turkey has had two prongs. One has been directed at Iran and the other at Greece. The effort to dominate Iran has failed. The effort in Greece has had a large measure of success but is not yet decided. The Russian effort in Greece has been aided by the Communist rebellion on the northern boundaries centered in adjacent



of the EAM. These Communist activities in Greece have undermined the financial position and the tranquility of Greece.

Meanwhile, the Russians have been spurring extensive activity in Hungary, Italy, France, and Austria.

In France Communist infiltration has been extremely successful, so successful that it appears that any time the Russians want to pull the rug they can do so.

In Italy Communist influence has grown enormously; in Hungary it is advancing; and in Austria it is going very well.

We have arrived at a situation which has not been paralleled since ancient history. A situation in which the world is dominated by two great powers. Not since Athens and Sparta, not since Rome and Carthage have we had such a polarization of power. It is thus not a question of pulling British chestnuts out of the fire. It is a question of the security of the United States. It is a question of whether two-thirds of the area of the world and three-fourth of the world's territory is to be controlled by Communists.

After this presentation the Congressional delegation were extremely impressed and said that they would support a program designed to strengthen Greece and Turkey. But they wanted to know what definite program we had for meeting the situation and what it would cost. They also stipulated that this program be presented to the public in terms almost as frank as those in which Secretary Marshall had presented it to them.

It is therefore necessary in the next week to draw up an elaborate program and President Truman will discuss it with the Congressional delegation on week from today.



Congress and the public in the frankest terms. Mr. Acheson says that we should not talk provocatively; specifically we should avoid accusing the Soviet Union directly but to talk instead about the spread of Communism without specifically tying it up to Russian direction.

In the public presentation the concept of individual liberty is basic, and the protection of democracy everywhere in the world. It is not a matter of vague do-goodism, it is a matter of protecting our whole way of life and of protecting the nation itself.

British action with respect to Greece is a part of the general program of British retrenchment throughout the world, as in Burma, Palestine, India, Egypt.

Our program in Greece should be: (1) to equip the Greek Army so that it can restore order, (2) make it possible for the Greeks eventually to reduce their military cost so that ~~they~~ will not be such a drain on the Greek economy, (3) bring about a reconstruction of Greek economy and administration so that it can be self-supporting.

Extensive legislation is required of Congress for relief, for delivering military equipment to the Greek Army, for personnel to carry out the economic and military program.

See the current issue of "World Report" for an analysis of the British white paper on their general economic condition.



under allied observance and they concluded that the elections had been fair. Last fall there was a plebis/<sup>cite</sup> on the King, and the opinion of the military observers there was also that it was a fair vote. The cabinet was reformed recently by the will of parliament. These are evidences of a real democracy in Greece. There is plenty of evidence that the government represents 75 to 80 percent of the electorate. The government is not a corrupt fascist regime.

See NEA's policy statement on Greece.

See the electoral report.

We are going to set up in Greece a economic organization to have in their hands virtual control of all the resources of the Greek state.

Why is Greece in danger of collapse?

What is the story of the EAM?

Instead of talking about the Russians encircling Greece, we should talk of Communist developments in all critical areas.

The theme of our new approach should be that the security of the United States depends upon our going to the aid of any and all democratic governments. Tommy Thompson said we should put this in the President's statement. We are not supporting any country in aggression but we will help them defend themselves.

We must make sure that the British go along with us.

We are certain to be charged with being anti-Soviet, with engaging in atomic diplomacy and with encircling the USSR.

Our line should be that war with the Soviet Union is not inevitable, but that if Communism spreads to all the critical areas where it



threatens now, war will be inevitable. This should be presented ~~if~~ as a way to avoid war.

General Arnold's statement: Greek geurillas now number 12,000. The Greek Army is unable to cope with these. Greece is the only country in the Balkans not under Soviet domination. If Greece falls, Soviet pressure on Turkey will be irrésistable. If Greece and Turkey should fall, the Eastern Mediterranean, with its oil supplies, would be untenable to the democracies.

We should point out in our public presentation that we have been interested for some time in developments in Greece. We can point to the visit of the Greek Prime Minister in January, and to the Porter Mission to show our interest.

We should talk about the cost of doing what we are going to do as compared to the cost to us if Turkey and Greece should go.

See NEA for Communist activity in Greece.

See EUA for telegram from Paris on new book on Communism and Bedell Smith telegrams.



The Drafting of the President's Message to Congress  
on the Greek Situation

Delivered before a Joint Session of Congress  
March 12, 1947.

The early part of this record is hearsay from Acheson and others concerned. When the message came from the British Ambassador on February 24, Secretary Marshall took up the matter promptly with the President, with the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and with the Chiefs of Staff, and it was decided that prompt and vigorous action was necessary.

The next step was the calling of Congressional leaders to the White House on February 27. At that meeting (according to Mr. Acheson) Mr. Acheson and the Secretary, in the presence of the President, presented the problem to Congressional leaders in outline form. The reaction of the Congressional leaders was rather trivial. At that point, Mr. Acheson then launched into a full analysis of just what Greece and Turkey meant to the security of the United States. He apparently reviewed the situation throughout the world, the pressure of communist parties everywhere, and the necessity, in the interest of the security of the United States, in taking a firm stand.

Most of the Congressional leaders were greatly shaken and impressed with this analysis and promised to support whatever measures should be necessary, on the condition that the President should explain the situation fully to Congress in a special message, and to the people by radio. They felt that they could support such a program only if the public were apprised of the grim facts. The President promised to go to the Congress and the people in this manner. He also promised to have a program, including the details of what would be required, prepared for a meeting of the Congressional leaders which he would call eight days thereafter, on Friday, March 7th.

Mr. Acheson called a meeting of key Departmental officers in the Secretary's office Friday morning, February 28. Present among others were Loy Henderson and Jack Hickerson (who were given chief responsibilities in the drafting of a program), Llewellyn Thompson, John Jernegan, John Howard of LE, Havlik, Tyler Wood, Francis Russell and myself, John Gange, etc. There Mr. Acheson in a masterful way described the meeting with Congressional leaders of the day before, outlined the situation as he had outlined it to the Congressional leaders, and told us that we would have to get to work and figure out a program and write a message to Congress and a radio speech for the President. There was before the meeting a document drafted in the Central Secretariat by John Gange (a copy of which I do not have) outlining the various parts of the program that would need to be worked up within the next week.

Mr. Acheson



Mr. Acheson then retired and Henderson (later replaced by Hickerson) took charge and began assigning responsibilities. When he got down to the drafting of a message to Congress and a radio address for the President, Hickerson very quickly said that he and Henderson would attend to that.

At the end of the meeting Hickerson said that this was certainly the most important thing that had happened since Pearl Harbor and that we should all approach our tasks with humility. We all felt bowled over by the gravity of the situation and the immensity of the steps that were contemplated.

The record from here on involves only the drafting of the President's message to Congress.

Friday afternoon Francis Russell invited me to sit in with the SWNCC Sub-Committee on Information which met to consider the problem of how the question should be presented to the public. In all of SWNCC's consideration there was never any distinction between how the problem should be presented by the President and how it should be presented in background form by the Departmental officers to journalists, radio people, etc. for the purpose of building up support for the Department's policy.

A somewhat smaller group representing the SWNCC Sub-Committee met in Francis Russell's office Saturday morning, March 1, to continue the work and to draft themes, background data, arguments, etc.

Over the week-end Francis Russell, Llewellyn Thompson, and John Jernegan refined the themes and arguments advanced at the previous meetings and worked up the "Information Program of United States aid to Greece", which was sent to Mr. Acheson on Tuesday, March 4.

Meanwhile, over the week-end several of us tried our hands at drafts of the President's message. Loy Henderson wrote a full-length message as did Gordon Merriam, and I confined myself to an attempt to set a tone in five pages of draft.

On Monday, March 3, Loy Henderson sent all of these, and perhaps some others, to Mr. Acheson. Late that afternoon Loy called me and said Mr. Acheson liked my draft best and to stand by for a call from Dean Acheson. Acheson called me late in the afternoon and told me to go ahead with the draft and to get in touch with Henderson.

The next day, March 4, a drafting conference was held in Mr. Acheson's office and I, as the drafter, took copious notes. Mr. Acheson started with the SWNCC paper and it provided a substantial part of the message. This paper, and parts of various drafts were mentioned, and Mr. Acheson indicated whether or not they might be pertinent. From the whole I got a general idea of what was desired.



in Mr. Acheson's office on March 5. This draft seemed to meet with general approval. Mr. Acheson said it was a good draft and proceeded to lead the group to a sentence by sentence consideration. Following this meeting, I prepared another draft, which was considered on Thursday March 6. After corrections this was sent over to the White House on Friday March 7. It was also sent to General Marshall in Paris, who replied the next day approving the message except for three minor points, which were deleted.

On Saturday, March 8, Carl Humelsine and I were called over to see Mr. Clark Clifford, Assistant to the President, at the White House. Mr. Clifford had a few specific suggestions but his main criticism was directed at the order of presentation of the draft. The earlier draft opened with the difficulties of Greece, went on to the general situation, and came back to Greece. He suggested that it begin with Greece and discuss Greece, proceed to the general, and then work up to specific proposals and peroration. I then returned to the Department and in an hour and a half, using the same material and same working, turned the whole thing around and it worked out very well. In fact, it was a marked improvement. This draft we returned to the White House and Mr. Clifford considered it on Sunday, March 9.

On Monday, March 10, Clifford brought over and discussed with Mr. Acheson, Mr. Humelsine and me the first White House draft (dated March 10), which was in essence the draft we had sent him plus a few additions. Most of these additions we considered objectionable and Mr. Clifford agreed in discussion to eliminate them. His readiness to acquiesce suggested that they were not his ideas but those of other White House Assistants (not the President's).

Mr. Clifford then returned to the White House and a conference was held with President Truman and Admiral Leahy, and several other advisors. At this conference the President and his advisors approved the draft virtually as presented to them, making only a few exceedingly minor changes.

This draft was sent over to the Department on Monday, March 11, and became the official message.

I have never working on an important State document before that went so smoothly. The major decisions had already been taken, and the specific legislative proposals were being prepared by others. The character and identity of my original draft was preserved throughout. The force of the argument was increased by the editing, rather than the contrary. This I attribute primarily to the fact that the President had promised to explain this situation frankly to the public and there was no possibility of going back on that promise and thus of watering down the argument. But entirely aside from that, I discovered no inclination whatever on the part of anybody in the Department or the White House to water it down. It represented genuinely the unanimous opinion of the Department.



There is another thing that should be said for the record. Dean Acheson told us at the first conference on this matter that we should proceed in our work, and with the President's message to Congress, without regard to General Marshall's position in Moscow. The General made this decision himself and ordered it emphasized to all concerned. This was in our opinion the act of a genuine statesman.

When the President returned from his Mexico trip he agreed to go to Congress in person on March 12 and deliver his message, thus obviating the necessity for a separate radio speech.

The message was in my opinion momentous not only for its content, but for the way in which the Government functioned in the crisis: fast, brave, and clean. It seemed to me as though it marked our passing into adulthood in the conduct of foreign affairs.



RE: The Secretary's Harvard Speech of June 5, 1947.

The reaction to Mr. Acheson's May 8 speech had been exceedingly favorable and had been successful in bringing the discussion back to the basis of economic aid, where it rightly belonged. In Europe, however, the opinion in regard to the Truman Doctrine continued to be highly critical and was quite responsive to the Soviet propaganda line that the United States had embarked upon a course of violent anti-Communism and imperialism. To my mind what was needed was a new speech by the Secretary of State directed primarily to the foreign audience and containing a highly attractive emotional and psychological appeal. What was necessary was an idea.

In some of the draft memoranda prepared by Cleveland a few days earlier (the middle of May) I had been impressed with his arguments for European unity. It occurred to me that this was the most popular single concept that the United States could present to Europe, namely, that Europe should unite, Europe should work together on a program of reconstruction. It seemed to me that this would hit the right psychological tone because Europe was afraid of both the USSR and the United States and that ~~if~~ we could convince Europe that our help was truly altruistic.

When, therefore, I was asked about May 15 to write an address for the Secretary to give at the University of Wisconsin on May 25, I began writing along this line. Before I had finished I was informed that the Secretary was not going to Wisconsin. Nevertheless since I knew that the Secretary was going to give a number of speeches in June, I thought it would be a good idea to finish this one and have it ready. I therefore completed it and on May 20 I sent it not only to a number of office directors for criticism, but sent it to Mr. Acheson.

A day or two later Mr. Acheson told me that he had taken my draft personally to the Secretary and had urged him to give it. I also learned that Mr. Acheson had discussed my draft and had praised it at his May 21 Staff Meeting.

Here ends the trail of my own knowledge. I heard nothing more about my draft.

Along around the 25th of May, however, I did hear that George Kennan was preparing a paper containing ideas somewhat similar to my draft. It appears that Kennan's paper went to the Secretary about a week after mine did. Just what effect Kennan's paper had on the Secretary's speech and what effect mine had, I do not know. Joe Johnson told me that he was sure that the Secretary did not get the idea of European unity from Kennan.

It would seem that the Secretary drafted his June 5 speech himself and that Bohlen worked it over and inserted considerable material. I have been extremely curious about this matter but has been impossible to trace it beyond this point.





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH KENNETH ROYALL

Ken Royall called at 2:30 P.M. July 24, 1947, and said that he, Judge Patterson, General Eisenhower and General Norstad had had a lengthy conference on the new unification bill. He stated that he was disappointed that the bill ended up in the final form in which it did. He feels that the new organization provided for under the bill will not save money, will not be efficient, and will not prevent inter-service disputes.

At the conclusion of the conference in the War Department, however, it was decided among those attending that the bill should be signed by the President and that every effort be made to make it work.

Royall believes that it is important that the services involved confer with reference to when the bill should become effective. He suggests that the subject should be discussed in a conference with the President and that agreement be reached.

Royall commented on the question of the selection of the Secretary of Defense. He states that Judge Patterson is his number one candidate for he believes he is best qualified to do the job. He adds, however, that he discussed the matter with Judge Patterson and Judge Patterson informed him that under no circumstances would he, Judge Patterson, be interested in taking the job. He served seven years in government and wishes to get back to the practice of law. Royall further states that his second choice for



the job would be Jim Forrestal. He believes that a man must be selected who has had an intimate knowledge and acquaintanceship with the services and with the long battle for unification.

C. M. C.

July 24, 1947



## EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

11-7-47

AUG 4 1947

1285

My dear Mr. Latta:

*mf*

In my letter of July 26 recommending approval of the National Security Act of 1947, I stated that a staff paper would be forwarded at an early date dealing with features of the Act which were less desirable than those formerly recommended by the President although not of sufficient moment to justify withholding approval of the bill. x w, c

Accordingly, the following points are called to the attention of the President:

1. By writing into the Act specific provisions respecting components and functions of the Army, the Navy, including naval aviation, and the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, less flexibility results. The President as Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense may be hampered in achieving the optimum of results which might otherwise be expected from the Act. It is conceivable that the writing of functions into law could inhibit prompt and decisive action at some time in the unforeseeable future.

The War Department, in commenting on this provision, states that the attempt to set forth the composition, roles, and missions of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force is not desirable and that such language may operate to confuse and delay the realization of the full benefits which are the objectives of the Act.

The inclusion of such language may also be in conflict with the carefully worked out balance agreed to by the services for incorporation in the Executive order made public last April and signed by the President on July 26.

2. The membership of the National Security Council is less flexible than that proposed in either the draft of bill as submitted to the Congress or as passed by the Senate. Members who may be designated by the President in addition to those specified in the Act are limited to secretaries of executive departments and the chairman of the Munitions and the Research and Development Boards. Hence, it would be impossible for the President to designate other agency heads or individuals from outside the Government as members of the council.

x1285-B





3. Authority of the Secretary of Defense to appoint and fix compensation of civilian personnel does not extend to the three military departments as was provided in the original bill and passed by the Senate. By excluding the personnel of the three departments from his control, the Secretary may be hampered in instituting uniform personnel policies and compensation schedules.

4. The law as passed provides that the Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to national security. The President should be in a position to designate a source or sources of his own choosing for official advice on security matters and not be limited to the Secretary of Defense whose primary role is as head of the military establishment.

The Act recognizes that the problems of the national security encompass the entire Government by providing for the National Security Council which may be composed of the secretaries of all military and executive departments. As a matter of practice, the President will find it impossible to rely on one person in this important field. x 3 x 129

It is likewise inappropriate to designate the President as a member of the Council and require him to preside over its meetings. This arrangement implies that decisions of the Council will be reached in the presence of the President. The Council is advisory to the President, and he should not be placed in the position of participating in deliberations which he later will evaluate in formulating policy.

5. The Act as passed limits the choice of the President to full-time chairmen of the National Security Resources Board, Munitions Board, and Research and Development Board rather than containing the more flexible provisions of the bill as originally transmitted. The War Department, in its comment dated July 29, believes that this restriction may preclude obtaining the services of the best qualified men for these offices. 1295 285-74

In general, the above points accord the President and the Secretary of Defense less flexibility than proposed in the original draft of legislation in dealing with matters involving the security of the United States and administration of the National Military Establishment.

Sincerely yours,

*James E. Webb*  
Director x 79




Mr. M. C. Latta



# MOSELEY & COMPANY

REAL ESTATE BROKERS

"NOTHING BUT BUSINESS PROPERTIES"  
RETAIL - WHOLESALE - INDUSTRIAL



LOCATIONS IN ALL PRINCIPAL CITIES

RAY F. MOSELEY  
BROOKS R. BALL  
FRANK W. TOBENER  
RAY F. MOSELEY, JR.  
FRANK W. MOSELEY  
EDWIN H. WARNER



NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS  
SOCIETY OF INDUSTRIAL REALTORS  
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF KANSAS CITY, MO.

PHONES VICTOR 7765

SUITE III INSURANCE EXCHANGE BUILDING

KANSAS CITY, MO.

November 26, 1947



The President

Dear Mr. President:

Two different friends of mine on returning recently from the Baptist World Alliance Meeting in Stockholm told me while there they made a trip to England, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and several other countries to see just what condition they were in, and I was greatly surprised to have them tell me they found these countries in a better condition than represented by our newspapers, and the people were not in want as badly as has been stated. Both of these gentlemen thought that the people of most of the countries they visited were inclined to be unwilling to work as they should to help themselves as long as we were continuing to help them, and I gathered from them the impression that we were throwing our money away and in some cases were doing more harm than good.

Undoubtedly you have sent representatives over there who apparently have given you a different picture, therefore I have a suggestion to make for what it is worth. Why not you appoint one man from each State of the Union to make an inspection of these European countries to see just what condition they are in before we continue to pour out our money and supplies to them, as this might save us considerable money, or in any event it should create a feeling among our people that they do need help and they would be happier to meet it.





All the people I have talked to, and I have talked to many, have a desire to help these countries to a degree, at least if our help is needed, but everyone seems to feel there is a limit as to what we should do in the way of draining our own resources and certainly if the need is not any more apparent than these people that I have talked to say it is, then I think we could be making a mistake.

Please remember these people I am speaking of are Christians, and want to help where help is needed, and that certainly is my feeling also, but I don't think we should throw our money away needlessly because like many others I believe there is a justification in a reasonable reduction in income taxes and believe this can be done if we watch the way we give our money away.

Kindest regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Ray Moseley

Ray F. Moseley/IB

Harry

In Oscar Johnson the  
Best Baptist Preacher in America  
think they need help badly  
& so does our new preacher  
Rev. Martin Luther King - a Col. in  
last war. We are proud of you.



December 1, 1947.



Dear Ray:

I appreciated very much your letter of November twenty-sixth and for your information I've known all the time that Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Holland are not in a bad way.

Only Norway got into the war and was not as badly treated as some of the other occupied countries. Britain, of course, expended all her resources holding the line. France was overrun, as was Austria and most of Italy. Germany was almost completely destroyed so far as its industries and homes are concerned and Poland was completely wiped out.

You must have a picture of the whole thing before you can make a decision on any of it and there has been so much propaganda put out by people who know nothing about the situation that it is hard to discover what the truth is.

I think we are approaching it in the right way. However, I am glad to have your views on it and appreciate your interest.

Sincerely yours,

**HARRY S. TRUMAN**


Mr. Ray F. Moseley  
Suite 1111 Insurance Exchange Building  
Kansas City, Missouri



This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the <sup>provisional</sup> Government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new <sup>State</sup> ~~Jewish~~ *of*

~~state~~ *Israel*

  
*Harry Truman*

*Approved  
May 14, 1948.*

*6.10*



217 WEST 125th STREET

NEW YORK 27, NEW YORK

Telephone: WAdsworth 6-4949

July 15, 1948

15  
 Reynolds  
 Chairman  
 Philip Randolph  
 Treasurer  
 J. Patterson  
 Executive Secretary  
 COMMITTEE  
 and Pace Alexander  
 T. M. Alexander  
 W. W. Bullock, Jr.  
 L. Carter  
 S. Dickerson  
 H. Houston  
 V. Lawson, Jr.  
 M. Nabrit

President Harry S. Truman  
 White House  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We were indeed happy that you decided to call Congress back into special session in order to act on civil rights legislation, among other matters. We trust that in your message to Congress on July 26 you will specifically ask for legislative approval of anti-lynching and other safeguards for Negro draftees. You are undoubtedly aware of the intense bitterness on the part of Negro citizens because of the bi-partisan "gentlemen's agreement" to scuttle the Langer amendments to the draft bill early in June.

The action most necessary today to strengthen the fabric of democracy is of the type that would enhance the dignity of second-class citizens. Because the 1948 Republican platform expressed its disapproval of army segregation and because the recently adopted platform of your own party in essence called for the abolition of racial distinctions within the military establishment, we feel that you now have a bi-partisan mandate to end military segregation forthwith by the issuance of an Executive Order.

May we take this opportunity to renew our request for a conference with you in the immediate future to discuss such an Executive Order. The date for registration under the draft is only a month away and it is the hope of all Negro youth that there will be an alternative beyond submission to a discriminatory law and imprisonment for following the dictates of self-respect.

Sincerely,

*Grant Reynolds*  
 Grant Reynolds, National Chairman

*Philip Randolph*



August 18, 1948



Dear Ernie:

I appreciated very much your letter of last Saturday night from Hotel Temple Square in the Mormon Capital.

I am going to send you a copy of the report of my Commission on Civil Rights and then if you still have that antibellum proslavery outlook, I'll be thoroughly disappointed in you.

The main difficulty with the South is that they are living eighty years behind the times and the sooner they come out of it the better it will be for the country and themselves. I am not asking for social equality, because no such thing exists, but I am asking for equality of opportunity for all human beings and, as long as I stay here, I am going to continue that fight. When the mob gangs can take four people out and shoot them in the back, and everybody in the country is acquainted with who did the shooting and nothing is done about it, that country is in pretty bad fix from a law enforcement standpoint.

When a Mayor and a City Marshal can take a negro Sergeant off a bus in South Carolina, beat him up and put out one of his eyes, and nothing is done about it by the State authorities, something is radically wrong with the system.

On the Louisiana and Arkansas Railway when coal burning locomotives were used the negro firemen were the thing because it was a backbreaking job and a dirty one. As soon as they turned to oil as a fuel it became customary for people to take shots at the negro firemen and a number were murdered because it was thought that this was now a white-collar job and should go to a white man. I can't approve of such goings on and I shall never approve it, as long as I am here, as I told you before. I am going to try to remedy it and if that ends up in my failure to be reelected, that failure will be in a good cause.



I know you haven't thought this thing through and that you do not know the facts. I am happy, however, that you wrote me because it gives me a chance to tell you what the facts are.



Sincerely yours,

**HARRY S. TRUMAN**

Mr. E. W. Roberts  
c/o Faultless Starch Company  
Kansas City, Missouri

Note in longhand --

This is a personal & confidential communication and I hope you'll regard it that way - at least until I've made a public statement on the subject - as I expect to do in the South.

HST

(Envelope marked - Personal and Confidential)

Report enclosed - "To Secure These Rights" --  
"The Report Of The President's Committee  
On Civil Rights"

208 ind "C" - 1000000



## REVISED DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

On October 24, 1948, the President stated that when a permanent government was elected in Israel, it would promptly be given de jure recognition. Elections for such a government were held on January 25th. The votes have now been counted, and this Government has been officially informed of the results. The United States Government is therefore pleased to extend de jure recognition to the Government of Israel as of this date.

Approved Jan. 31, 1949  
Harry S. Truman



April 12, 1949



My dear Ben:

Your letter of April first is most interesting. The main difficulty is that you start off with the wrong premise. Nobody is working for socialized medicine - all my Health Program calls for is an insurance plan that will enable people to pay doctor bills and receive hospital treatment when they need it.

I can't understand the rabid approach of the American Medical Association - they have distorted and misrepresented the whole program so that it will be necessary for me to go out and tell the people just exactly what we are asking for.

I am trying to fix it so the people in the middle income bracket can live as long as the very rich and very poor.

I am glad you wrote me because I think there are a lot of people like you who need straightening out on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

*Harry.*

Mr. Ben Turoff  
Lees Summit  
Missouri

*T: 276-1009: 709*



September 8, 1949



Dear Sam:

I read your letter of September first with a lot of interest. You evidently got an immense amount of political information in the two and one-half months you were in Britain and it is most interesting. I have many reports on the situation in Great Britain and I have come to the conclusion that the British have always handled their internal affairs to their own satisfaction and I propose to let them continue to do it. We have never been in complete agreement with them on anything. That disagreement started in 1776. If you remember fundamentally, however, our basic ideas are not far apart - they gave us our fundamental and basic law and have been our allies in nearly every war we have fought since 1860. You must remember they have been through two of the most terrible experiences in the history of the world - experiences which cost them the young men of two generations. Had our losses been in proportion we would have lost between twelve and fifteen million of our young men. Try to contemplate what that would mean to this country.

I note carefully what you say about Mercy Hospital and the General Hospital. I am not worried about that end of the population nor am I worried about those who make \$25,000 a year and over. The health of the people between those two extremes is what is most important to the country and when we find 34% of our young men and women unfit for military service because of physical and mental defects, there is something wrong with the health of the country and I am trying to find a remedy for it. When it comes to the point where a man getting \$2400.00 a year has to pay \$500.00 for prenatal care and then an additional hospital bill on top of that there is something wrong with the system. Before I get out of this office I am going to find out what is wrong and I am going to try and remedy it. I'd suggest you Doctors had better be hunting for a remedy yourselves unless you want a drastic one.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Dr. Sam E. Roberts ✓  
1110 Professional Building  
Kansas City, Missouri



WB055 DL PD

RENO NEV FEB 11 1139A

The White House  
Washington



THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

1950 FEB 11 PM 7 31

IN A LINCOLN DAY SPEECH AT WHEELING THURSDAY NIGHT

I STATED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HARBORS A NEST OF  
COMMUNISTS AND COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS WHO ARE HELPING TO  
SHAPE OUR FOREIGN POLICY. I FURTHER STATED THAT I HAVE IN  
MY POSSESSION THE NAMES OF 57 COMMUNISTS WHO ARE IN THE  
STATE DEPARTMENT AT PRESENT. A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN



11  
FLY DENIED THIS AND CLAIMED THAT THERE IS NOT A SINGLE  
COMMUNIST IN THE DEPARTMENT. YOU CAN CONVINCE YOURSELF OF  
THE FALSITY OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT CLAIM VERY EASILY.  
YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU PERSONALLY APPOINTED A BOARD TO  
SCREEN STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES FOR THE PURPOSE OF  
WEEDING OUT FELLOW TRAVELERS. YOUR BOARD DID A PAINS-TAKING  
JOB. AND NAMED HUNDREDS WHICH IT LISTED AS "DANGEROUS TO  
THE SECURITY OF THE NATION", BECAUSE OF COMMUNISTIC  
CONNECTIONS.



WHILE THE RECORDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO ME, I KNOW



ELY THAT OF ONE GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 300 CERTIFIED  
TO THE SECRETARY FOR DISCHARGE, HE ACTUALLY DISCHARGED ONLY  
APPROXIMATELY 80. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS DONE AFTER  
LENGTHY CONSULTATION WITH ALGER HISS. I WOULD SUGGEST  
THEREFORE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU SIMPLY PICK UP YOUR  
PHONE AND ASK MR. ACHESON HOW MANY OF THOSE WHOM YOUR  
BOARD HAD LABELED AS DANGEROUS, HE FAILED TO DISCHARGE.  
THE DAY THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE EXPOSED  
ALGER HISS AS AN IMPORTANT LINK IN AN INTER-NATIONAL  
COMMUNIST SPY RING, YOU SIGNED AN ORDER FORBIDDING THE







S  
STATE DEPARTMENTS GIVING TO THE CONGRESS ANY INFORMATION  
IN REGARD TO THE DISLOYALTY OR THE COMMUNISTIC CONNECTIONS  
OF ANYONE IN THAT DEPARTMENT, DISPUTE THIS STATE DEPARTMENT  
BLACKOUT, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COMPILE A LIST OF 57  
COMMUNISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THIS LIST IS AVAILABLE  
TO YOU, BUT YOU CAN GET A MUCH LONGER LIST BY ORDERING THE  
SECRETARY ACHESON TO GIVE YOU A LIST OF THESE WHOM YOUR OWN  
BOARD LISTED AS BEING DISLOYAL, AND WHO ARE STILL WORKING  
IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING IS THE  
MINIMUM WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED OF YOU IN THIS CASE





(1) THAT YOU DEMAND THAT ACHESON GIVE YOU AND THE PROPER CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE THE NAMES AND A COMPLETE REPORT ON ALL OF THOSE WHO WERE PLACED IN THE DEPARTMENT BY ALGER HISS, AND ALL OF THOSE STILL WORKING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO WERE LISTED BY YOUR BOARD AS BAD SECURITY RISKS BECAUSE OF THE COMMUNISTIC CONNECTIONS.

(2) THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION OR HELP FROM THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT IN EXPOSING COMMUNISTS.



11  
FAILURE ON YOUR PART WILL LABEL THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF  
BEING THE BED-FELLOW OF INTER-NATIONAL COMMUNISM. CERTAINLY  
THIS LABEL IS NOT DESERVED BY THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF  
LOYAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATS THROUGHOUT THE NATION, AND BY THE  
SIZABLE NUMBER OF ABLE LOYAL DEMOCRATES IN BOTH THE SENATE  
AND THE HOUSE

JOE MC CARTHY U.S.S. WIS..





My dear Senator:

I read your telegram of February eleventh from Reno, Nevada with a great deal of interest and this is the first time in my experience, and I was ten years in the Senate, that I ever heard of a Senator trying to discredit his own Government before the world. You know that isn't done by honest public officials. Your telegram is not only not true and an insolent approach to a situation that should have been worked out between man and man but it shows conclusively that you are not even fit to have a hand in the operation of the Government of the United States.

I am very sure that the people of Wisconsin are extremely sorry that they are represented by a person who has as little sense of responsibility as you have.

Sincerely yours,

[HST]





Not mailed

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Feb. 26, 1950.

Dear Jonathan:- I wonder if you have thought to go into the background and ability of each member of the cabinet and those who sat with the cabinet which I inherited on April 12, 1945. It should make an interesting chapter in your book. Maybe I shouldn't bring the subject to your attention, but as I look back on that situation it makes me shudder. I am sure that God Almighty had me by the hand. He must have had a personal interest in the



2  
welfare of this great Republic.

There was Stettinius, Sec. of State - a fine man, good looking, amiable, cooperative, but never an idea new or old; Morgan - that, Hock Lead, nut - I wonder why F.D.R. kept him around. Maybe you know. He fired himself from my cabinet by threatening what he'd do to me under certain circumstances. Then there was Stimson, a real man - honest straight-forward and a statesman, sure enough. Francis Biddle, attorney general - you make your own analysis. Frank Walker, P.M.G. - my kind of man, honest, decent, loyal - but no new ideas. Miss Perkins, Sec.



of Labor, a grand lady - but no politician. F. D. R. had removed every bureau and power she had. Then Henry Wallace, Sec. of Commerce, who had no reason to love me or to be loyal to me. Of course he was not loyal. "Honest" Harold Iches who was never for anyone but Harold, would have cut F. D. R.'s throat - or mine for his "high minded" ideas of a leadership and did. Agriculture's Wickard, a nice man, who never learned how his department was set up. Then there was Les Crowley, whose sense of honor was minus and Chester Bowles, fine control man whose idea of administration was consensation with crazy communists.



Thank God Fred Vinson was  
there as O.W. M. R. and Bill Davis  
as Chairman of the Labor Board.

But, Jonathan, there was not  
a man in the list who would  
talk frankly at a Cabinet meeting.  
The honest ones were afraid to  
and the others wanted to fool  
me any how.

Am I wrong? Take a look  
and see how and in what  
manner they left me.

Sincerely



For Forestal, you'll have to evaluate  
yourself. He never could make a  
decision. Harold Smith, AI counsiler.

303  
P.S. - Personal - Davis, J.



Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

AUG 22 8 06 AM '50

RECEIVED

The Honorable Harry S. Truman  
The President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:


The United States Marine Corps has again on the battlefields of Korea demonstrated that it is an effective hard-hitting mobile force which can be depended upon to produce results on the battleground.

Over the past 180 years, the Marine Corps time and again have proved that they are invaluable to the defense of America and fight the aggressors which threaten American security.

In my opinion, the United States Marine Corps is entitled to full recognition as a major branch of the Armed Services of the U. S., and should have its own representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense. I, therefore, sincerely urge that as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces you will grant the Marine Corps representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

X/285-7

Very truly yours,



Gordon L. McDonough, M.C.  
15th District, California

GLM:s



1285-6

Marine Corps

August 29, 1950

FILED BY  
MISS CONWAY  
SEP 2 1950

My dear Congressman McDonough:

I read with a lot of interest your letter in regard to the Marine Corps. For your information the Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's.

x259

x220

x427

Nobody desires to belittle the efforts of the Marine Corps but when the Marine Corps goes into the army it works with and for the army and that is the way it should be.

x1285-B

I am more than happy to have your expression of interest in this naval military organization. The Chief of Naval Operations is the Chief of Staff of the Navy of which the Marines are a part.

x1285-6 Naval  
Operations

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Gordon L. McDonough x  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

x1285-6



PROPOSED ORDER TO GENERAL MacARTHUR TO BE SIGNED BY  
THE PRESIDENT

I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, U. S. Army, Far East.

You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select.

My reasons for your replacement, ~~which~~ <sup>and are</sup> will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, ~~will be communicated to you by Secretary Pace.~~

*contained in the next following message.*

*Dwight D. Eisenhower*





## PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "HSE", with a long horizontal line extending from the end of the signature.





## PROPOSED ORDER TO LT. GEN. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY

The President has decided to relieve General MacArthur and appoint you as his successor as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, U. S. Army, Far East.

It is realized that your presence in Korea in the immediate future is highly important, but we are sure you can make the proper distribution of your time until you can turn over active command of the Eighth Army to its new commander. For this purpose, Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet is enroute to report to you for such duties as you may direct.

*HS*



GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

30 October 1952

Present: Harry B. Price  
Roy E. Foulke

1. The Marshall Plan was an outgrowth of the disillusionment over the Moscow Conference which proved conclusively that the Soviet Union was not negotiating in good faith and could not be induced to cooperate in achieving European recovery. Consideration was given to inaugurating the European Recovery Plan at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference but I vetoed this suggestion because I did not want it to appear that the western allies had come to Moscow Conference with a prior agreement to go ahead without Soviet cooperation. Further, differences with Britain over reparations, etc. and the necessity for working out details of the plan prevented disclosure at this time.

2. The cardinal consideration during the period from the end of the Moscow Conference until my Harvard speech was to time properly the offer of U.S. assistance so as to assure domestic acceptance of the proposal. Our intention at all times was to "spring the plan with explosive force" in order not to dissipate the chances of U.S. acceptance by premature political debate. Little consideration was given to the European to our proposal since it was believed that they were sufficiently desperate to accept any reasonable offer of U.S. aid.

3. The greatest fear was of an adverse reaction from the Mid-West -- from "Bert McCormick and the Chicago Tribune". Originally I had planned to accept a degree from the University of Michigan in order to spring the "plan" in the heartland of expected opposition, however this ceremony was cancelled because details of the plan could not be worked out in time. My second decision was to reveal the proposal during my acceptance of a degree from Amherst on June 16th. However, a worsening of conditions in Europe and a full "realization of the dreadful situation in Europe" forced a stepping up of this schedule and I reversed an earlier decision not to accept a degree from Harvard on June 5th, 1947, in order to announce the U.S. proposal to assist Europe if they would work together cooperatively in devising means for making U.S. aid effective.

4. I took only a few intimate advisors into my confidence during the preparation of the European Recovery Program plan. I asked Kennan and Bohlen to present separate memoranda concerning means of meeting the European crisis. Kennan's was the most succinct and useful -- this was during the embryo<sup>periled</sup> of State's policy planning staff. I also drafted a paper reflecting my own views on this subject. Other than Bohlen and Kennan I consulted only Acheson and Lovett (at least these are the only ones mentioned -- REF) for fear that my deliberations would be "leaked". The June 5th speech was not completed until after I had left Washington



30 October 1952

my speech, particularly my statement that the U.S. proposal was aimed at hunger, poverty, and chaos and not against any group and my inclusion of all Europe including the Soviet Union and her satellites. Despite their opposition I insisted on formulating the speech as it was finally delivered.

5. As implied in the speech, I insisted that "the European countries come clean" -- that is, that they come up with a workable plan for European recovery based on actual requirements, not what they thought the U.S. would give. For this reason I insisted that we not help Europe in the formulation of the European Recovery Program. I was subjected to heavy pressure from Clayton (then in Switzerland), Lew Douglas and others to let them consult with the Europeans and to let them advise the Europeans on the formulation of a plan for European recovery. However, I issued "an almost arbitrary, military-type command" that they were not to participate with the Europeans in the formulation of this plan. (It is my recollection that Clayton did go to Paris to assist the Europeans in the formulation of the recovery plan. If my recollection is correct Clayton urged the Europeans to scale down drastically their early estimate of dollar requirements to a figure which might be acceptable to the U.S. Congress -- REF).

6. The plan had not been discussed with Europe in advance and Europe's prompt response represented quick foot work. Bevan and Bideault vied for leadership in the formulation of the ERP with Bevan generally winning out. The ability and character of Oliver Franks played a large part in the quality of the result. Getting Europe to agree that Britain should receive "such a large plug" of the total U.S. aid was one of the major problems.

7. The selling of the ERP to the American people was an exacting task and I traveled so widely in this regard it "almost seemed as though I were running for office". I had good success in enlisting the cooperation of special interest groups although it was particularly tough to get the cooperation of those groups representing items in short supply (wheat, cotton, tobacco, etc.). Ironically, by the time the Marshall Plan was put in operation these items were in surplus supply and a reverse pressure to export these items through the Marshall Plan was exerted.

8. Senator Vandenburg was not consulted prior to the Harvard speech. He soon became a full partner in the adventure, however, and we consulted together twice weekly at the Blair House. These meetings were kept secret and this secrecy resulted in charges that I was not enlisting bipartisan support. I worked closely with Senator Vandenburg on the Vandenburg resolution -- in fact, the first draft of this resolution was prepared by Lovett at my request. Senator Vandenburg took the Lovett draft and "improved it 1000% on his own typewriter". I feel that Vandenburg has never received full credit for his monumental efforts on behalf of the European Recovery Program. "Vandenburg was my righthand man and at times I was his righthand



30 October 1952

9. Hoffman was the only man seriously considered by Senator Vandenburg and myself (no mention was made of any Taft role in this selection -- REF). The position required a man of competence, particularly someone completely unselfish who sought no personal gain from the position (most people do). Hoffman filled the bill.

10. Unlike most earlier State Department programs the ERP required large sums of money which meant that the House had to be fully considered. This varied from the normal Senate-treaty procedure and created jealousy between House and Senate leaders -- a further problem for Vandenburg.

11. Acheson, Clayton, Cohen speeches and statements did not represent "trial balloons" or any sort of build-up for the ERP. In fact, "I gave Cohen hell" for his West Coast speech (about April or May?) for fear that it would reveal my plans and start the much feared "premature debate".

12. In my opinion the Soviet Union and her bloc came close to associating themselves with the ERP. They changed their minds only after the Paris consultations.

REF:ep

13 Nov. '52



November 4, 1952

Sir:

Their Majesties the King and Queen of the Hellenes have directed me to convey to the President and Mrs. Truman and to Miss Truman their heartiest invitation to visit Greece as the nation's guests, when they undertake the journey to various countries of the free world which, it is reported, they are considering.

Knowing how very busy the President is at this time, may I ask Your Excellency to kindly bring to his notice this invitation, which I shall, of course, be happy to renew to him in person, whenever he may be able to receive me.

Together with our King and Queen, every man and woman of Greece is anxious to express, on Greek soil, to the father of the Truman doctrine, the affection, admiration and deep gratitude which the Greek people hold for all the President and the American people have done for the survival of Greece, in the face of a peril as deadly as any in her long history. They also wish that all Greece, and particularly the city of Athens may pay tribute to the great American who has laboured arduously and courageously to unite Europe and to bring peace, freedom and prosperity to a troubled world.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

/s/ A. G. POLITIS

His Excellency  
Dean G. Acheson.





Italy

President Harry S. Truman  
Independence, Missouri

Dear President Truman:

The appearance of my book, Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the Pacific War, a review of it in the American Historical Review by Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, and the recently published book by General Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, brings to the fore again the questions of:

- 1) Just when orders were sent to drop the first bomb on Hiroshima, and
- 2) Through what channels and by and to whom?

Despite your own references to the subject (Year of Decisions, pages 420, 421, and 423), and your letter of December 6, 1952 to Professor James L. Cate of the University of Chicago, printed in Volume 5 of their official history of the U.S. Air Force) these questions remain uncertain and perplexing.

I will not trouble you with all the reasons why historians find them so. In brief, it is because no instruction later than the first Directive of July 25, 1945, sent from Potsdam, has so far been found in the Manhattan Project file; there is no mention of any in Secretary Stimson's Diary or General Spaatz's papers (Professor Craven so informs me); General Groves says he knows of none, and Professor Morison who presumably reviewed the pertinent file of the Navy does not give any citation from that file.

So I am sure that all students of the subject would be greatly obliged if you would search your memory again, and have someone go through records that are in Independence, and see what they tell. What is most needed is authoritative and full detail, which probably you alone can supply.

So I would urge you to take the trouble involved, and so make it possible to have a reliable and agreed-on public record.

I am writing this from Italy where I am engaged in an altogether different piece of work. But we sail from France at the end of April on the S.S. United States, due to arrive in New York on May 2. So I would you please send

*Just the proposed which sent!*



your answer to my permanent home in York, Maine: U.S.A.

I should greatly hope that you will give me permission to publish in a professional journal (probably the American Historical Review) any new information you may transmit - in whatever form seems suitable to you.

With sincere regards to yourself and Mrs.  
Truman,

Respectfully yours  
*Herbert Feis*

Herbert Feis



File

My dear Mr. Feis:



You write just like the usual egghead. The pits are before you but you'd like to gaffe them. The instruction of July 25th, 1945 was final.

It was made by the Commander in Chief after Japan refused to surrender.

Churchill, Stimson, Patterson Eisenhower and all the rest agreed that it had to be done. It was. It ended the Jap War. That was the objective. Now if



you can think of any other  
"if, as, and when" egghead  
contemplations <sup>very</sup> hanging out.

You get the same answer  
to end the Jap War and save  
140 of a million of our young-  
sters and that many Japs  
from death and twice that  
many on each side from being  
mained for life.

It is a great thing that  
you or any other contem-  
plator "after the fact" didn't  
have to make the decision.

Our boys would all be dead.



HARRY S. TRUMAN  
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

August 5, 1963

Dear Kup:

I appreciated most highly your column of July 30th, a copy of which you sent me.


I have been rather careful not to comment on the articles that have been written on the dropping of the bomb for the simple reason that the dropping of the bomb was completely and thoroughly explained in my Memoirs, and it was done to save 125,000 youngsters on the American side and 125,000 on the Japanese side from getting killed and that is what it did. It probably also saved a half million youngsters on both sides from being maimed for life.

You must always remember that people forget, as you said in your column, that the bombing of Pearl Harbor was done while we were at peace with Japan and trying our best to negotiate a treaty with them.

All you have to do is to go out and stand on the keel of the Battleship in Pearl Harbor with the 3,000 youngsters underneath it who had no chance whatever of saving their lives. That is true of two or three other battleships that were sunk in Pearl Harbor. Altogether, there were between 3,000 and 6,000 youngsters killed at that time without any declaration of war. It was plain murder.

I knew what I was doing when I stopped the war that would have killed a half million youngsters on both sides if those bombs had not been dropped. I have no regrets and, under the same circumstances, I would do it again - and this letter is not confidential.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Harry S. Truman". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "H" and "T".

Mr. Irv Kupcinet  
Chicago Sun-Times  
Chicago, Illinois



November 24, 1945



Dear Joe:

I appreciated your letter of the nineteenth and the quotation from the Palestine Histadruth Committee of Minneapolis.

I told the Jews that if they were willing to furnish me with five hundred thousand men to carry on a war with the Arabs, we could do what they are suggesting in the Resolution - otherwise we will have to negotiate awhile.

It is a very explosive situation we are facing and naturally I regret it very much but I don't think that you, or any of the other Senators, would be inclined to send a half dozen Divisions to Palestine to maintain a Jewish State.

What I am trying to do is to make the whole world safe for the Jews. Therefore, I don't feel like going to war for Palestine.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Joseph H. Ball  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.



# Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 20, 1945

SUBJECT:

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5  
Dept. of State letter, Aug.  
By MLT/HLC, NARS Date 7-

PARTICIPANTS: The President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Grew,  
Ambassador Harriman, and Mr. Bohlen.

COPIES TO:



070 1-14

After the Secretary presented Ambassador Harriman to the President the latter said that he wished to thank the Ambassador for the great service he had done for him in connection with Molotov's coming to the San Francisco Conference. He said that he deeply appreciated this and he wished to congratulate the Ambassador and to express the hope that he would return to Moscow and continue his excellent work. Ambassador Harriman said that he had felt that that was the most appropriate suggestion he could make when Marshal Stalin had indicated his desire to make some gesture. He said that he had not felt it possible to do anything about the Polish question since Stalin was merely speaking of a gesture.

At the President's request Ambassador Harriman then made a brief report on his opinion of the present problems facing the United States in relation to the Soviet Union. He said that he thought the Soviet Union had two policies which they thought they could successfully pursue at the same time—one, the policy of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain, and the other, the extension of Soviet control over neighboring states through unilateral action. He said that he thought our generosity and desire to cooperate was being misinterpreted in Moscow by certain elements around Stalin as an indication that

the



Soviet Government could do anything that it wished without having any trouble with the United States. He said that he thought the Soviet Government did not wish to break with the United States since they needed our help in order to reduce the burden of reconstruction and that he felt we had nothing to lose by standing firm on issues that were of real importance to us. The Ambassador then outlined a number of the specific difficulties which he had recently encountered in Moscow and described the deterioration of the Soviet attitude since the Yalta Conference. The President said that he was not in any sense afraid of the Russians and that he intended to be firm but fair since in his opinion the Soviet Union needed us more than we needed them. Ambassador Harriman said that he believed that some quarters in Moscow believed erroneously that American business needed as a matter of life and death the development of exports to Russia. Mr. Harriman said that this was of course not true but that a number of Russian officials believed it. The President again repeated that he intended to be firm with the Russians and make no concessions from American principles or traditions for the fact of winning their favor. He said he felt that only on a give and take basis could any relations be established.

Ambassador Harriman said that in effect what we were faced with was a "barbarian invasion of Europe", that Soviet control over any foreign country did not mean merely influence on their foreign relations but the extension of the Soviet system with secret police, extinction of freedom of speech, etc., and that we had to decide what should be our attitude in the face of these unpleasant facts. He added that he was not pessimistic and felt that we could arrive at a workable basis with the Russians but that this would require a reconsideration of our policy and the abandonment of the illusion that for the immediate future the Soviet Government was going to act in accordance with the principles which the rest of the world held to in international affairs. He said that obviously certain concessions in the give and take of negotiation would have to be made. The President said that he thoroughly understood this and said that we could not, of course, expect to get 100 percent of what we wanted but that on important matters he felt that we should be able to get 85 percent.

The Ambassador then outlined briefly the issues involved in the Polish question explaining his belief that Stalin had discovered from the Lublin Poles that an honest execution of the Crimean decision would mean the end of Soviet-backed Lublin control over Poland since any real democratic leader such as Mikolajczyk would serve as a rallying point for 80 or 90 percent of the Polish people against the Lublin Communists. He said it was important for us to consider what we should do in the event that Stalin rejected the proposals contained in the joint message from the President and the Prime Minister and if Molotov proved adamant in the negotiations here in Washington.



He said he would like to inquire in this connection of the President how important he felt the Polish question was in relation to the San Francisco Conference and American participation in the world organization. The President replied immediately and decisively that in his considered opinion unless settlement of the Polish question was achieved along the lines of the Crimean decision that the treaty of American adherence to a world organization would not get through the Senate. He added that he intended to tell Molotov just this in words of one syllable.

The Secretary inquired whether if Molotov was so late in arriving in Washington there would not be sufficient time for any real discussion between the Foreign Ministers, if the President would desire that the conversations on Poland be continued in San Francisco. The President replied that he thought that was a good idea.

Ambassador Harriman inquired whether or not we would be disposed to go ahead with the world organization plans even if Russia dropped out as he had understood from the Secretary. The President said that the truth of the matter was that without Russia there would not be much of a world organization.

In concluding the interview the President stated that he fully realized that he was not up on all details of foreign affairs and would rely on the Secretary of State and his Ambassadors to help him in this matter but that he did intend to be firm in his dealings with the Soviet Government. He said he hoped to see the Secretary and Ambassador Harriman again before Molotov arrived.

*Charles E. Bohlen*  
Charles E. Bohlen





406  
x25  
Legal Case  
August 31, 1945

My dear General Eisenhower:

I have received and considered the report of Mr. Earl G. Harrison, our representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, upon his mission to inquire into the condition and needs of displaced persons in Germany who may be stateless or non-repatriable, particularly Jews. I am sending you a copy of that report. I have also had a long conference with him on the same subject matter.

While Mr. Harrison makes due allowance for the fact that during the early days of liberation the huge task of mass repatriation required main attention, he reports conditions which now exist and which require prompt remedy. These conditions, I know, are not in conformity with policies promulgated by SHARP, now Combined Displaced Persons Executive. But they are what actually exists in the field. In other words, the policies are not being carried out by some of your subordinate officers.

For example, military government officers have been authorized and even directed to requisition billeting facilities from the German population for the benefit of displaced persons. Yet, from this report, this has not been done on any wide scale. Apparently it is being taken for granted that all displaced persons, irrespective of their former persecution or the likelihood that their repatriation or resettlement will be delayed, must remain in camps - many of which are overcrowded and heavily guarded. Some of these camps are the very ones where these people were herded together, starved, tortured and made to witness the death of their fellow-inmates and friends and relatives. The announced policy has been to give such persons preference over the German civilian population in housing. But the practice seems to be quite another thing.

We must intensify our efforts to get these people out of camps and into decent houses until they can be repatriated or evacuated. These houses should be requisitioned from the German civilian population. That is one way to

x1.66  
x 190-8



implement the Potsdam policy that the German people "cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves."

I quote this paragraph with particular reference to the Jews among the displaced persons:

"As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them. They are in concentration camps in large numbers under our military guard instead of S.S. troops. One is led to wonder whether the German people, seeing this, are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy."

You will find in the report other illustrations of what I mean.

I hope you will adopt the suggestion that a more extensive plan of field visitation by appropriate Army Group Headquarters be instituted, so that the humane policies which have been enunciated are not permitted to be ignored in the field. Most of the conditions now existing in displaced persons camps would quickly be remedied if through inspection tours they came to your attention or to the attention of your supervisory officers.

I know you will agree with me that we have a particular responsibility toward these victims of persecution and tyranny who are in our zone. We must make clear to the German people that we thoroughly abhor the Nazi policies of hatred and persecution. We have no better opportunity to demonstrate this than by the manner in which we ourselves actually treat the survivors remaining in Germany.

I hope you will report to me as soon as possible the steps you have been able to take to clean up the conditions mentioned in the report.

I am communicating directly with the British Government in an effort to have the doors of Palestine opened to such of these displaced persons as wish to go there.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd) HARRY S. TRUMAN

General of the Army D. D. Eisenhower. \*408  
G.Hq. USFET



HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER  
Office of the Commanding General

8 October 1945

Dear Mr. President:



This is my full report on matters pertaining to the care and welfare of the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution within the United States Zone of Germany. It deals with conditions reported by Mr. Earl G. Harrison, U. S. Representative on the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, which was forwarded to me under cover of your letter of 31 August 1945.

Since Mr. Harrison's visit in July many changes have taken place with respect to the condition of Jewish and other displaced persons. Except for temporarily crowded conditions, the result of shifts between established centers and an influx of persons into centers as winter approaches, housing is on a reasonable basis. Nevertheless, efforts to improve their condition continue unabated. Subordinate commanders are under orders to requisition German houses, grounds, and other facilities without hesitation for this purpose.

The housing problem must be seen in full perspective. This winter the villages and towns in the U. S. Zone of Germany will be required to house more than twice their normal population. One million and a half German air raid refugees who were evacuated into Southwestern Germany, together with some 600,000 Germans, Volksdeutsche and Sudetens who fled from Poland, New Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia before the advancing Red Armies have created a condition of congestion in the U. S. Zone which forces the most careful conservation of housing space. At this moment the U. S. Zone is under orders to absorb 152,000 more Germans from Austria. Added to this influx of population, there is the loss of housing in bombed-out cities, averaging well over 50 percent; the necessity for billeting large numbers of our troops; and the accommodation required for prisoners of war. The resulting housing shortage is not merely acute, but desperate. Notwithstanding this situation, in my recent inspections and those made by my staff of Jewish centers, although crowded conditions were found,



in nearly every instance more than the 30 square feet per person of floor space required for our soldiers was available.

Displaced persons have absolute preference over Germans for housing, but the requirements of the distribution of supplies, the provision of medical care, and the need for welfare activities make it desirable that displaced persons be sufficiently concentrated so that these services may be performed efficiently by the limited supervisory personnel and transport at our disposal. Thus, considerable use has been made of large installations such as brick barracks, apartment blocks and other public buildings in preference to scattered individual billets.

Special centers have been established for Jewish displaced persons. In the latter part of June, the Armies were directed to collect into special assembly centers displaced persons who did not wish to or who could not be repatriated. On 25 July 1945, Dr. Rabbi Israel Golstein, President of the United Jewish Appeal, recommended that non-repatriable Jews be separated from other stateless people, and placed in exclusively Jewish centers. As a result, the American Joint Distribution Committee was called upon to supervise the establishment of these centers. This policy was reiterated and expanded on 22 August. Special Jewish centers were established for "those Jews who are without nationality or those not Soviet citizens who do not desire to return to their country of origin".

At the time of Mr. Harrison's report there were perhaps 1,000 Jews still in their former concentration camps. These were too sick to be moved at that time. No Jewish or other displaced persons have been housed in these places longer than was absolutely necessary for medical quarantine and recovery from acute illness. It has always been our practice, not just our policy, to remove these victims with the utmost speed from concentration camps.

The assertion that our military guards are now substituting for SS troops is definitely misleading. One reason for limiting the numbers permitted to leave our assembly centers was depredation and banditry by displaced persons themselves. Despite all precautions, more than 2,000 of them died from drinking methylated alcohol and other types of poisonous liquor. Many others died by violence or were injured while circulating outside our assembly centers. Perhaps then we were over-zealous in our surveillance. However, my present policy is expressed in a letter to subordinate commanders wherein I said:



Necessary guarding should be done by displaced persons themselves on the volunteer system and without arms. Military supervisors may be employed, but will not be used as sentries except in emergency. Everything should be done to encourage displaced persons to understand that they have been freed from tyranny, and that the supervision exercised over them is merely that necessary for their own protection and well-being, and to facilitate essential maintenance.

I feel that we have problems of shelter and surveillance in hand. Of equal importance is the provision of sufficient and appetizing food. In the past, a 2,000-calorie minimum diet was prescribed for all displaced persons in approved centers. Our field inspections have shown that in many places this scale was consistently exceeded, but there have also been sporadic instances where it was not met. Three or four thousand persons of the persecuted categories, including German Jews, in the American Zone have returned to their home communities. Many are there making a genuine effort to re-establish themselves. Until recently, there has been no clear-cut system of assuring adequate food for this group, although in most cases they have been given double rations.

I have recently raised the daily caloric food value per person for ordinary displaced persons in approved centers to 2,300, and for racial, religious and political persecutees to a minimum of 2,500. Feeding standards have also been prescribed and sufficient Red Cross food parcels and imported Civil Affairs/Military Government foodstuffs are on hand to supplement indigenous supplies and meet requisitions to maintain these standards. We are now issuing a directive that those Jews and other persecuted persons who choose and are able to return to their communities will receive a minimum ration of 2,500 calories per day, as well as clothing and shoes, the same as those in centers.

Clothing and shoes are available in adequate amounts and of suitable types. Uniformly excellent medical attention is available to all Jewish people in our centers where they have generally adequate sanitary facilities. UNRRA and AJDC staffs, which are administering an increasing number of our centers, are becoming efficient, and are making it possible for these people to enjoy spiritually uplifting religious programs as well as schooling for children.

It is freely admitted that there is need for improvement. The schools need more books; leisure-time and welfare activities must be



further developed; paid employment outside the centers needs to be fostered; additional quantities of furniture, bedding and fuel must be obtained. We have made progress in re-uniting families, but postal communications between displaced persons and their relatives and friends cannot yet be inaugurated; roads and walks must be improved in anticipation of continuing wet weather. We are conscious of these problems, we are working on them, and we have expert advice of UNRRA, of Jewish Agencies, and of our Chaplains.

23  
In certain instances we have fallen below standard, but I should like to point out that a whole army has been faced with the intricate problems of readjusting from combat to mass repatriation, and then to the present static phase with its unique welfare problems. Anticipating this phase, I have fostered since before D-Day the development of UNRRA so that persons of professional competence in that organization might take over greater responsibilities, and release our combat men and officers from this most difficult work.

You can expect our continued activity to meet the needs of persecuted people. Perfection never will be attained, Mr. President, but real and honest efforts are being made to provide suitable living conditions for these persecuted people until they can be permanently resettled in other areas.

Mr. Harrison's report gives little regard to the problems faced, the real success attained in saving the lives of thousands of Jewish and other concentration camp victims and repatriating those who could and wished to be repatriated, and the progress made in two months to bring these unfortunates who remained under our jurisdiction from the depths of physical degeneration to a condition of health and essential comfort. I have personally been witness to the expressed gratitude of many of these people for these things.



Respectfully,

*W. W. Harrison*  
x408

The Hon. Harry S. Truman  
The President of the United States  
The White House, Washington, D. C.



*Sent by messenger  
w/ each to them  
12/22/45*

December 22, 1945

127

MEMORANDUM TO:



Secretary of State x20  
Secretary of War x25  
Attorney General x10  
War Shipping Administrator x46  
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service x7-83  
Director General of UNRRA x423

The grave dislocation of populations in Europe resulting from the war has produced human suffering that the people of the United States cannot and will not ignore. This Government should take every possible measure to facilitate full immigration to the United States under existing quota laws.

The war has most seriously disrupted our normal facilities for handling immigration matters in many parts of the world. At the same time, the demands upon those facilities have increased many-fold. It is, therefore, necessary that immigration under the quotas be resumed initially in the areas of greatest need. I, therefore, direct the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, the War Shipping Administrator, and other appropriate officials to take the following actions:

The Secretary of State is directed to establish with the utmost despatch consular facilities at or near displaced person and refugee assembly center areas in the American zones of occupation. It shall be the responsibility of these consular officers, in conjunction with the Immigrant Inspectors, to determine as quickly as possible the eligibility of the applicants for visas and admission to the United States. For this purpose the Secretary will, if necessary, divert the personnel and funds of his Department from other functions in order to insure the most expeditious handling of this operation. In cooperation with the Attorney General, he shall appoint as temporary vice-consuls, authorized to issue visas, such officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service as can be made available for this program. Within the limits of administrative discretion, the officers of the Department of State assigned to this program shall make every effort to simplify and to hasten the process of issuing visas. If necessary, blocks of visa numbers may be assigned

x190-This  
x133



to each of the emergency consular establishments. Each such bloc may be used to meet the applications filed at the consular establishment to which the bloc is assigned. It is not intended however entirely to exclude the issuance of visas in other parts of the world.

Visas should be distributed fairly among persons of all faiths, creeds and nationalities. I desire that special attention be devoted to orphaned children to whom it is hoped the majority of visas will be issued.

With respect to the requirement of law that visas may not be issued to applicants likely to become public charges after admission to the United States, the Secretary of State shall cooperate with the Immigration and Naturalization Service in perfecting appropriate arrangements with welfare organizations in the United States which may be prepared to guarantee financial support to successful applicants. This may be accomplished by corporate affidavit or by any means deemed appropriate and practicable.

The Secretary of War, subject to limitations imposed by the Congress on War Department appropriations, will give such help as is practicable in:

(a) Furnishing information to appropriate consular officers and Immigrant Inspectors to facilitate in the selection of applicants for visas; and

(b) Assisting until other facilities suffice in:

- (1) Transporting immigrants to a European port;
- (2) Feeding, housing and providing medical care to such immigrants until embarked; and

(c) Making available office facilities, billets, messes, and transportation for Department of State, Department of Justice, and United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration personnel connected with this work, where practicable and requiring no out-of-pocket expenditure by the War Department and when other suitable facilities are not available.

The Attorney General, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, will assign personnel to duty in the American zones of occupation to make the immigration inspections, to assist consular officers of the Department of State in connection with the issuance of visas, and to take the necessary steps to settle the cases of those aliens presently interned at Oswego through appropriate statutory and administrative processes.

The Administrator of the War Shipping Administration will make the necessary arrangements for water transportation from the part of embarkation in Europe to the United States subject to the provision that





the movement of immigrants will in no way interfere with the scheduled return of service personnel and their spouses and children from the European theater.

The Surgeon General of the Public Health Service will assign to duty in the American zones of occupation the necessary personnel to conduct the mental and physical examinations of prospective immigrants prescribed in the immigration laws.

The Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration will be requested to provide all possible aid to the United States authorities in preparing these people for transportation to the United States and to assist in their care, particularly in the cases of children in transit and others needing special attention.

In order to insure the effective execution of this program, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, War Shipping Administrator and the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service shall appoint representatives to serve as members of an inter-departmental committee under the Chairmanship of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.



(Sgd) HARRY S. TRUMAN




THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1944.

Dear Bob:-

You have written me about Harry Truman and Bill Douglas. I should, of course, be very glad to run with either of them and believe that either one of them would bring real strength to the ticket.

Always sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Franklin D. Roosevelt". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the beginning and a large, looping "R" at the end.

Honorable Robert E. Hannegan,  
Blackstone Hotel,  
Chicago,  
Illinois.



WASHINGTON

April 12, 1945



Mrs. George P. Wallace  
605 West Van Horn Road  
Independence, Missouri

Dear May:

Certainly did appreciate your letter of the Ninth and so did the whole family.

I am sending young Perryman the picture which you suggested.

I imagine that Spott is getting fatter and fatter. I have gained nine pounds myself. What do you think of that? So Spot and I will be in the same class.

Glad you liked the Buffalo speech.

The situation back here gets no better fast. It looks as if I have more to do than ever and less time to do it, but some way we get it done. If I don't get this letter dictated to you, I will never get it written.

Tell George and Frank and Natalie hello. Bess and Margaret and Mrs. Wallace all want to be remembered. They are all in good health and spirits.

Sincerely yours,

*Harry*  
Harry S. Truman

*This was dictated before the  
mail left in on me. But I'm*



~~TOP SECRET~~  
U R G E N T

FROM: AGWAR Washington

TO : Tripartite Conference Babelsberg, Germany

NO : WAR 41011

30 July 1945.

To the President from the Secretary of War.

The time schedule on Groves' project is progressing so rapidly that it is now essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, 1 August. I have revised draft of statement, which I previously presented to you, in light of

- (A) Your recent ultimatum,
- (B) Dramatic results of test and
- (C) Certain minor suggestions made by British of which Byrnes is aware.



While I am planning to start a copy by special courier tomorrow in the hope you can be reached, nevertheless in the event he does not reach you in time, I will appreciate having your authority to have White House release revised statement as soon as necessary.

Sorry circumstances seem to require this emergency action.

*See Over*

ACTION: Gen. Vaughan

VICTORY-IN-733

(31 July 1945)

302217Z

800



all war  
Reply to your 41011  
suggestions approved  
Release when ready  
but not sooner than  
August 2.

HST





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



This is a great privilege.  
I have been here before  
as a United States Senator,  
- a Junior United States Senator.

It was my good luck on  
those occasions, to hear President  
Roosevelt express himself at  
his best. He told you gentlemen  
of the press exactly what  
he thought of you - and made  
you like it.

I haven't his ability of ex-  
pression, but I shall be



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



glad to tell you what I  
think of you, of the entertain-  
ment, of the food, the country,  
the guests and so forth.

I have enjoyed the evening,  
the food, the entertainment  
that goes without saying.  
I always enjoy myself when in  
in your company, whether  
I sit with the Hard Rockers,  
who are said to be close to  
Truman or with the Soft  
Muckers who are said not  
to be so close to him.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



I enjoyed Governor Dewey's speech very much. You know I did not have the pleasure of meeting the Governor until Oct. 27, 1945. I met him then on the main deck of the Battleship Missouri, and he took my breath away by announcing, publicly, that I had made a good speech on foreign affairs, in Central Park and that he wholeheartedly approved it. Time and Mr. Luce disagreed with him.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



I am returning Mr. Dewey's highly appreciated compliment.

I wonder if I could cry on your shoulder a bit about public service in reconstruction and what happens to a Vice-President when he suddenly falls heir to a great president and two train ends all in one fell swoop.

You know in war time men and women are patriotic. They'll stand hardship + sacrifice, abuse and bullets, fox holes +



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



communists and editorials and  
whatnot for their country's  
welfare. But let the wars  
suddenly cease. These same  
patriots become free men  
and women, working in a  
free enterprise struggle -  
and they begin to dip for the  
gray. Their skins again become  
thin and gossip and abuse  
makes them timid.

I found as a chairman  
of an investigating com-  
mittee that even in war  
time some of our greatest



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



industrial and labor leaders could dish out criticism on a grand scale - but when they landed on the taking end - they just couldn't take it. But a man in public life has to take and like it. Now I find that none of the big boys want to take positions where the gossip columnists and know-it-all editors can pick flaws in their public actions. I spend a third of my time begging good men to stay



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



in public life service, or to  
come into it.

When the great President  
passed on, everyone felt  
sorry for me - big business,  
little business, the press,  
the radio, labor - the Congress.  
Nearly every body in the United  
States either came to see me,  
wrote me, or phoned me  
that he'd do anything in the  
world to help me - and I'm  
most sure all of you  
meant it.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



Then Germany folded up  
and Atomic Energy came  
along and folded up Japan  
and scared the rest of the  
world to death. Then the  
Exodus started and the  
Red Sea parted.

I believe I've made a  
record on something—  
Walter Lippmann had said  
<sup>Jim</sup> Lippmann—a da da da pol,  
Dorothy Thompson prayerfully  
wishes Roosevelt was back—



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



and so do I. Frank Kent  
yells Junior one day and  
Wolf the next. I've reached  
top notch popularity according  
to Doctor Gallup. Now labor  
is mad at management  
and they are both mad at  
me. I've made labor mad  
trying to give them a little  
public responsibility. Manage-  
ment says I'm worse than  
Roosevelt - a compliment  
maybe. Then Congress goes  
off the reservation so far



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



a my 21 points are con-  
cerned. The Navy is mad  
at the Army and they are  
both mad at me. Phil  
Murray is awful mad at  
Senell Aron - and they'd  
both like to carry me out.  
Pat Hurley says his for my  
foreign policy - and that  
I have it got one. Mobster  
is mad at Berlin and they  
are both mad at me -  
and so are the Arabs and  
the Jews - and the D.A.R.s.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



If the Gridiron Club would like to give me something for Christmas, I'd suggest they send me Dale Carnegie's Book, or I may have to start another war.

But actually, it is a great responsibility and I'm not shirking it. It has fallen to my lot to assume the greatest burden any man ever had, and I'm giving it all I have - it may not be enough, but I can't help that.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



You know the most terrible  
decision a man ever  
had to make was made  
by me at Potsdam. It had  
nothing to do with Russia  
or Britain or Germany.  
It was a decision to loose  
the most terrible of all  
destructive forces for the  
wholesale slaughter of human  
beings. The Secretary of War,  
Mr. Stimson, and I weighed  
that decision most prayer-  
fully. But the President



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



had to decide. It occurred  
to me that a quarter of a  
million of the flower of  
our young manhood were  
worth a couple of Japanese  
cities, and I still think  
they were and are. But  
I couldn't help but think  
of the necessity of getting  
out women and children  
and non-combatants. We  
gave them fair warning  
and asked them to quit.  
We picked a couple of cities



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



where war work was the principle industry, and dropped the boats. Russia hurried in and the war ended.

Now we are faced with equally grave decisions. On those decisions rest either peace and the greatest age in history or another armament race and total destruction of civilization as we know it.

Now my friends it is



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



time for prayer and  
most solemn thought.

Sherman was wrong  
I'm telling you I find  
peace is left and  
repeat.



Jan. 5, 1946.

Hon. Jas. F. Byrnes,  
Sec. of State.



My dear Jim:- I have been considering some of our difficulties. As you know I would like to pursue a policy of delegating authority to the members of the cabinet in their various fields and then back them up in the results. But in doing that and in carrying out that policy I ~~do not~~ not intend to turn over the complete



authority of the President  
nor to forego the President's  
prerogative to make the  
final decision.



Therefore it is absolutely  
necessary that the President  
should be kept fully informed  
on what is taking place.  
This is vitally necessary  
when negotiations are taking  
place in a foreign capital, or  
even in another city than  
Washington. <sup>at home</sup> This procedure  
is necessary in domestic  
affairs and it is vital in



foreign affairs.

At San Francisco no agreements or compromises were ever agreed to <sup>without</sup> my approval. At London you were in constant touch with me and communication was established daily if necessary.

That procedure did not take place at this last conference. I only saw you for a possible thirty minutes the night before you left after your interview with the Senate Committee.

I received no communication from you directly





while you were in Moscow.  
The only message I had from  
you came as a reply to one  
which I had Under Secretary  
Apperson send to you about  
my interview with the Senate  
Committee on Atomic Energy.

The protocol was not sub-  
mitted to me, nor was the  
communiqué. I was completely  
in the dark on the whole  
conference until I requested  
you to come to the White House  
and inform me. The com-  
muniqué was released before  
I even saw it.

Now I have the utmost



confidence in you and in  
your ability but there should  
be a complete understanding  
between us on procedure.  
Hence this memorandum.

For the first time I read  
the Etheridge letter this morn-  
ing. It is full of information  
on Romania & Bulgaria and  
confirms our previous in-  
formation on those two police  
states. I am not going  
to agree to the recognition  
of those governments unless  
they are radically changed.

I think we ought to protest  
with all the vigor of which



we are copath ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> the  
Russian program in Iran.  
There is no justification  
for it. It is a parallel to  
the program of Russia in  
Latvia, ~~and~~ Estonia and  
Lithuania. It is also in  
line with the high handed  
and arbitrary manner in  
which Russia acted in  
Poland.

At Potsdam we were faced  
with an accomplished fact and  
were, by circumstances almost  
forced to agree to Russian oc-  
cupation of Eastern Poland



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



and the occupation of that  
part of Germany east of the  
Oder River <sup>by the G.P.</sup> it was a high  
handed outrage.

At the time we were an-  
xious for Russian entry into  
the Japanese War. Of course  
we found later that we  
didn't need ~~them~~ <sup>Russians</sup> there and  
that they <sup>Russians</sup> have been a head  
ache to us ever since.

When you went to Moscow  
you were faced with another  
accomplished fact in Iran.  
Another outrage if ever



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



I saw one.

Iran was our ally  
in the war. Iran was Russia's  
ally in the war. Iran agreed  
to the free passage of arms  
ammunition and other sup-  
plies <sup>supplies into</sup> ~~to Iran~~ of millions of  
tons across her territory  
from the Persian Gulf to the  
Caspian Sea. Without these  
supplies furnished by the  
United States, Russia would  
have been ignominiously  
defeated. Yet now Russia



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

stirs up rebellion and  
keeps troops on the soil of  
her friend and ally-Iran.

There isn't a doubt in  
my mind that Russia  
intends an invasion of  
Turkey and the seizure of  
the Black Sea Straits to the  
Mediterranean. Unless Russia  
is faced with an iron fist  
and strong language another  
war is in the making. Only  
one language do they under-  
stand - How many divisions



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



love you?<sup>2</sup>

I do not think we should  
play compromise any longer.  
We should refuse to recognize  
Rumania and Bulgaria  
until they comply with our  
requirements; we should  
let our position on Iraq  
be known in no uncertain  
terms and we should con-  
tinue to insist on the in-  
ternationalization of the  
Kiel Canal, the Rhine-Danube  
waterway and the Black  
Sea Straits and we should



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



Maintain complete control  
of Japan and the Pacific.  
We should rehabilitate China  
and create a strong central  
government there. We should  
do the same for Korea.

Then we should insist on  
the return of our ships from  
Russia and pay a settle-  
ment of their Lend Lease  
Debt of Russia.

I'm tired hating the Soviets

Sincerely,  
Harry Truman





Senators and Representatives and really make this a government of by and for the people. I think no more of the Wall Street crowd than I do of Lenin and Whitney.

Let's give the country back to the people. Let's put transportation and production back to work, hang a few traitors and make our own country safe for democracy, tell Russia where to get off and make the United Nations work. Come on boys let's do the job.





The President of the United States, under his Constitutional power has found it necessary to declare a "National Emergency" and to call for volunteers to support the Constitution of the United States. That Constitution is the greatest document of government, of, by and for the people ever written.

We have fought the greatest war in the history of the world and that war was won by the United States of America. Let no one tell you that any other country won it.





We are a peace loving people and while we like to fight individually, collectively we would much rather have world peace than to have world war. Time we're shown that when necessary we can win World Wars.

In world war II we furnished the planes, the guns, the ammunition, the ships, the men to bring victory over two of the most despicable nations the world has ever produced — Germany and Japan.

Our young men were drafted for service and they





paced bullets, bombs and disease to win the victory.

At home those of us who had the country's welfare at heart worked day and night. But some people work neither day nor night and some tried to sabotage the war effort entirely. No one knows that better than I. John L. Lewis called two strikes in War Time, to satisfy his ego. Two strikes which were worse than bullets in the back to our soldiers. He held a gun at the head of the Government. The Rail Unions did exactly





the same thing. They all were receiving from four to forty times what the man who was being facing the enemy fire on the front was receiving. The effete union leaders receive from five to ten times the net salary of your president.

Now these same union leaders on V. J. day told your president that they would cooperate 100% with him to reconsect to peace time production. They all lied to him.

First came the threatened





Automobile strike. Your President asked for legislation to cool off and consider the situation. A weak kneed Congress didn't have the intestinal fortitude to pass the bill.

Mr. Murray and his Communist friends had a corruption fit and Congress had labor jitters. Nothing happened.

Then came the electrical workers strike, the steel strike the coal strike and now the rail tie up. Every single one of the strikers and their the demagog leaders have been living in luxury, working





when they pleased and  
drawing from four to forty  
times the pay of a fighting  
soldier.

I am tired of the govern-  
ment's being plotted, vilified  
and misrepresented. Now  
I want you men who are  
my comrades in arms  
you men who fought the  
battles to save the nation  
just as I did twenty five  
years ago to come along  
with me and eliminate  
the Levises, the Whitneys the  
Johnsons, the Communist  
Bridges and the Russians